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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
"Editing" in memory usually means a process which occurs 
somewhere between the implicit responses to a stimulus and the 
final overt response (Melton, 1967). Furthermore, the concept 
seems to be intimately related to "knowing" about the correct­
ness or incorrectness of a response. 
Several important behavioral phenomena appear to point 
directly to underlying editing processes, yet because most 
of these phenomena are well known and commonplace and because 
of the covert nature of editing, there has been little in the 
way of systematic documentation for these behaviors. 
In an early investigation of multiple list learning 
McKinney and McGeoch (1935) noted frequent interlist intru­
sions as well as several cases of words from other lists 
written down and (incompletely) scratched out. This scratch­
ing out of responses may be viewed as evidence for an editing 
mechanism which is based on the S's identification of the in­
correctness of his responses. Likewise, the intrusions can 
be considered as cases of failure of the editing mechanism. 
Similarly, other interference theorists have long used 
the concept of a "selector mechanism," which operates through 
knowledge of list membership, to explain the omission of 
competing responses (Underwood and Schulz, 1960). According 
to this view, the Ss generate implicit responses, recognize 
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these when wrong, and suppress responding. 
Additionally, "tip of the tongue" behaviors are closely 
related to the process of editing. Commonly S^s will make 
overt errors which they quickly reject as incorrect, seeming­
ly aware that they are near the correct answer, but not able 
to immediately produce it. For example, in trying to recall 
a person's name the £'s responses might be, "Pearson, Peirce, 
Patterson, Patten, Peters, Peterson" (correct). Many 
authors have given descriptive accounts of the "tip of the 
tongue" phenomenon (e.g., Freud, 1954; James, 1950), and 
recently the behavior has been investigated under laboratory 
conditions. 
By reading dictionary definitions of rare words to Ss, 
Brown and McNeill (1966) were able to produce several "tip 
of the tongue states." They found that in such states £s were 
variously able to indicate parts of the missing target words 
(letters, prefixes) as well as information about the abstract 
form of the word sought (number of syllables, syllabic 
stress, meanings). 
The retention of meanings in the absence of specific 
item identification has also been shown by Yavuz and Bous-
field (1959). Their Ss learned to respond to paralogs 
(nonsense syllables presented under the guise of "Turkish 
words") with English "translations." Even in the absence 
of recall, semantic-differential ratings of the paralogs 
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indicated retention of connotative meanings appropriate to the 
absent English words. Apparently, emotional reaction may be 
an attribute of memory which is stored as a component of the 
whole item and may be retained independently. 
In tip of the tongue states report that they have 
strong feelings that they know the item sought. Hart (1965) 
emphasized the actual accuracy of these feelings. He began 
by reading general information questions (e.g., "Who wrote 
'The Tempest'?"), and when answers were not forthcoming, 
asked ^s to predict their ability to recognize the correct 
answer from among other incorrect alternatives. They were 
able to do so with an accuracy significantly above chance. 
Aware that £s may sometimes withold responses from recall 
due to a general conservatism (response bias) and that such 
responses could be the source of feelings of knowing. Hart 
(1966) replicated the original study using forced responding. 
This procedure reduced the ability to predict recognition, 
but performance was still significantly above chance. (Note, 
however, that this factor was not controlled in the Yavuz and 
Bousfield study.) 
Recent work by Hart has dealt with the "feeling of know­
ing" phenomenon under more controlled conditions as well. 
Here control was exercised over the input phases of memory 
in addition to testing. In a paired-associate task. Hart 
(1967) used words as stimuli and consonant trigrams (CCC's) 
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as responses. One, two, or three presentations of the 42-
pair list were given followed by a recall test. Employing 
his usual "RJR" paradigm (recall-judgement-recognition), 
Hart found that £s could also accurately predict the recog­
nition of the trigrams which they couldn't recall. 
In the 196 7 report Hart indicated that for his measures 
to be maximally accurate in terms of "memory monitoring" 
ability, Ss should predict recognition in the same propor­
tion as they are actually accurate in recognizing. That 
is, the difficulty of the recognition test is an important 
factor in the measured ability to predict, and, by the same 
reasoning, so are biases for or against reporting feelings 
of knowing. The confounding of response bias with the 
dependent variable represents a strong argument for the use 
of alternative methodologies. 
On the other hand, a measurement technique directly 
relevant to confidence rating accuracy has been developed. 
Although originally interpreted as an index of memory 
(Murdock, 1966), the "Type II" d' of Signal Detection Theory 
is now usually interpreted as a measure of correct versus 
incorrect response discriminability (Hochhaus, 1970; 
Murdock, 1970). The logic of the analysis is quite simple; 
Ss use confidence ratings to indicate the certainty of their 
responses. The degree of match between high ratings and 
correct responses is given by the d' measure; the tendency to 
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under- or overuse particular ratings is given by 6 
(response bias). The d' and 8 measures are statistically 
independent. 
By way of summarization, the Hart research has shown 
that Ss are able to accurately predict recognition even when 
recall memory is absent. Hart has proposed a "memory 
monitoring (MEMO)" process to summarize this talent, yet has 
left the dynamics of the MEMO process completely unspecified; 
he implies that the MEMO system operates prior to or in the 
absence of retrieval (Hart, 1966, 1967). 
Another interpretation of the "feeling of knowing" 
phenomenon has been given by Adams (1967) in terms of a two-
trace memory system. The "closed-loop" theory of Adams is 
based on a feedback model which was first proposed by Mowrer 
(1960); in Adams' words, "the response of the system is fed 
back and compared with a reference level which defines the 
correct value for the system. If there is an error difference 
between the response and the reference level, the system 
undertakes an adjustive correction to lessen the error, com­
pares the resultant response with the reference level again, 
adjusts again, and so on," (pp. 291-292). Editing processes 
are handled by treating recall as the joint effect of inde­
pendent retrieval and recognition (reference level) processes. 
When recall attempts produce a close match with the 
independently stored recognition traces, Ss will report "yes" 
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as their feeling of knowing (as long as the recognition 
traces are strong ones). On the other hand, negative feelings 
of knowing are presumed to arise from far matches as a re­
sult of weak recognition traces. Following the judgement 
stage of the feeling of knowing experiment Ss take the recog­
nition test; since Adams' theory states that performance on 
the recognition test is based on the recognition traces, the 
result is a correlation between feeling of knowing and 
recognition. In the present review, however, it will be 
argued that the two process views of Hart and Adams are per­
haps not parsimonious with regard to an alternative, simpler 
conception of the feeling of knowing phenomenon based on a 
single-process memory model. 
For any theoretical account the important problem 
concerning the feeling of knowing process is understanding 
how the S can know his capacity for a correct response and how 
he is later able to prove this on a recognition test. These 
are the questions to which Study I of the present investi­
gation is directed. 
The mechanism used here as an explanation of the "feeling 
of knowing" phenomenon is that of partial recall. According 
to this view, Ss in some cases recall less than the whole 
item, and it is on this basis that they can recognize items 
which they cannot recall. 
To test partial recall as a factor in recognition 
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McNulty (1965) used recognition distractor items which shared 
many parts of the target word. For example, when Ss were 
forced to choose between word pairs such as boldness and 
coldness, the difficulty of recognition approached that of 
recall. However, the fact that recognition was still some­
what superior to recall may also have been due to part-whole 
processes. The £s in this case may not recall because they 
only remember the first letter; yet this partial information 
is enough to make recognition possible. 
The present theoretical approach is similarly based on 
a multicomponent view of memory. It is proposed that an 
item is represented in memory as a list of discrete features. 
For example, "lion" might be encoded as animal, ferocious, 
name begins with L, ... Such a scheme is similar to other 
multicomponent models (e.g., Bower, 1967; Brown and McNeill, 
1966; Norman and Rumelhart, 1970; Underwood, 1969) and no 
great elaboration is intended here. Rather, the data of 
Brown and McNeill are taken as evidence that the partial 
recall of these features is possible and it will be argued 
that such a mechanism provides a possible explanation of 
the "feeling of knowing" phenomenon. 
Support for this approach is found in a study by DaPolito, 
Guttenplan, and Steinitz (1968) who modified Hart's procedure 
by adding an "elimination stage" to the RJR technique. After 
judgement but prior to recognition Ss were asked to indicate 
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recognition alternatives which they felt were definitely in­
correct. The £s eliminated more incorrect alternatives 
following a "yes" judgement than following a "no" judgement. 
Partial information retained, according to the DePolito 
et al. and the present view, can explain the result in terms 
of a hypothetical scanning mechanism which allows Ss to reject 
incorrect alternatives on the basis of a "mismatch" against 
this partial information. If this is the case, then one can 
expect the recall of partial information to account for feel­
ings of knowing. Study I is an attempt to support this hypo­
thesis by comparing partial recall measures and feeling of 
knowing judgements on the basis of the capacity to predict 
recognition. 
In the second phase of the present research the partial 
recall model is related to multiple-choice recognition memory. 
Additionally, the second guessing paradigm is emphasized, 
since one of the questions to be investigated concerns the 
conditions under which Ss can exhibit accurate editing 
responses (certainty judgements) for second guesses. 
First choice errors in the multiple-choice task, like 
recall errors, do not mean that the S is without information 
as to the correct alternative. Second guessing data provide 
the primary support for this statement. For example, in a 
five-choice recognition test the S is informed of his errors 
and is asked to guess again. The probability correct for 
9 
second choices, conditional on error, is not one-fourth as one 
might expect from an "all-or-none" view, but has been shown 
to be significantly above chance (e.g., Bregman, 1966; 
Brown, 1965a). The second guess paradigm has also been 
effectively used in the study of perceptual thresholds and 
tachistoscopic recognition (e.g., Swets, Tanner, and Birdsall, 
1961). 
Brown (1965b) has developed an index to estimate "the 
average probability of rejecting an incorrect alternative" 
and has shown its relevance in comparing performances on tests 
which vary in the number of response alternatives. It is one 
of the purposes of Study II to approach second guessing 
behavior in another fashion and attempt its explanation 
through the previously described concept of partial recall. 
One criterion for simulation models is "Can it be shown 
how such a mechanism could be built?" Here a similar question 
is asked of the multicomponent model, "Can it be shown how 
such memory representations could lead to the observed 
phenomenon?" To affirm this, the following hypothetical 
situation is described; it is felt that such speculation is 
warranted by the testable propositions which can be derived 
from the multicomponent model. 
Consider again the earlier example and that the S is 
asked to associate the word lion to some stimulus. Presume 
further that the orthographic attribute "name begins with L" 
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was forgotten while "animal" and "ferocious" were retained. 
Next, assume the following multiple-choice recognition terms 
are given as a test of memory for the associate of the 
stimulus; book, caterpiller, tiger, lion. It will be seen 
that the S can eliminate the first two alternatives on the 
basis of his partial recall, yet must guess between tiger and 
lion. If he chooses tiger and is told he is wrong, it follows 
that his second choice will very likely be correct. 
The reader should recognize that the number of features 
encoded may be more than those specified in the present example 
(cf. Underwood, 1969); the proposed approach is not an attempt 
to specify these features, it is merely meant to be a sketch 
of how accurate second guesses might occur. However, several 
theoretical hypotheses do follow from the multicomponent 
view. 
First, multiple-choice errors should in most cases de­
pend on the correct response. Since, hypothetically, several 
items may share the remembered attribute or attributes, e.g., 
"ferocious," the ^  may be led to an incorrect response. This 
is especially true if a "liberal naming strategy" (Norman and 
Rumelhart, 1970) is adopted, as would be the case under forced 
response instructions. Following such an error the S 
would be asked to make a second guess. Since he knows the 
first answer is wrong he can choose another item which shares 
the quality "ferocious" and this time have a very good chance 
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of being correct. Thus it is proposed that, given the S 
chooses an incorrect alternative, Y, the response most likely 
correct is that alternative most similar to Y. In other 
words, it is felt that errors in multiple-choice responding 
bear information about the correct alternative. 
Next, it is proposed that if and only if such information 
does present itself in first choice errors, then second 
choices will be above chance accuracy. The amount of infor­
mation about the correct alternative which is conveyed in 
errors should correlate highly with performance on second 
choices. 
Another requirement of the multicomponent mechanism is 
that second choices be similar to first choices (i.e., first 
and second choices should show common attributes). In infor­
mation theory terms the information in first choices should 
be transmitted to second choices. 
Next, the number of attributes remembered should in­
fluence the £'s confidence rating projections of second test 
performance. The theoretical question here is quite similar 
to the relationships described for Study I. The more at­
tributes recalled, the more a response should appear to be on 
the "tip of the tongue" and as a result, the S should become 
more confident that the correct response could be identified. 
Also, a condition implied by this is that confidence ratings 
should relate to second choice performance. That is, high 
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ratings should indicate a higher probability correct than low 
certainty ratings. 
If response alternatives could be constructed which would 
make all alternatives highly similar, then information in 
errors would be minimal and also the performance on second 
choices would be impaired. However, it is difficult to find 
such simple elements. What is required is a class of figures 
which share no common attributes, i.e., each figure is unique 
to itself within the set. It is possible that no such set 
exists. For example, the set 1, 2, 3, 4 is differentiable 
into "odd" and "even"; the last three items in the set a, b, 
c, d all contain the basic "ee" sound. The alternative 
to trying to fix a boundary condition for response similarity 
is to make investigations of more than one set, establishing 
the hypothetical null condition described above as a reference 
point from which to judge the model at points more and less 
removed from the boundary state. According to this view, 
response similarity should (1) decrease information in errors, 
(2) decrease second choice accuracy, (3) decrease information 
communicated from first choices to second responses, (4) 
decrease the relationship between first responses and later 
confidence ratings, and (5) decrease the discriminability of 
correctness for second choice responses. 
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STUDY I 
The present investigation was an attempt to provide 
evidence for partial recall as a mechanism underlying the 
ability of Ss to predict accurately their recognition of 
items which they could not recall. A "study-test" paired-
associate task was employed in which the recall responses 
were such that partial recall scores could be easily ob­
tained. It was predicted that partial recall scores provide 
a substitute measure for "feeling of knowing" judgements made 
by the Ss. 
Method 
Subjects 
The 24 £s were students from Iowa State University intro­
ductory psychology courses; extra credit was given for partici­
pation. An equal number of £s were assigned to each of the 
two conditions (1 versus 2 training trials) on the basis of 
order of appearance. 
Materials 
The response terms learned were highly codifiable "con­
cepts" presented as figures. These consisted of four 
dimensions of two attributes per dimension. Dimensions and 
attributes were: Number- 1, 2; size- large, small; color- white, 
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black; shape- square, triangle. The 16 response terms were 
the unique combinations of these attributes and were paired 
with 16 high meaningfulness nouns (stimulus terms) from the 
Pavio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) list. Two orders of these 
pairs were prepared for presentation on 3 x 5 cards. 
Procedure 
Using the "study-test" method of paired-associate learn­
ing, Ss viewed the lists under instructions to learn as many 
pairs as possible. Following the learning stage Ss in both 
conditions were given a recall test. The recall test con­
sisted of a sheet containing the 16 nouns, each followed 
by a grid which listed all possible attributes (see Appendix 
A). The recognition test was also printed on this sheet 
and was folded under and kept out of sight until the end of 
recall. 
The £s indicated their recall responses by circling one 
attribute for each dimension, where this mode of response 
had been fully described in the instructions prior to the 
learning stage. Next, the Ss placed confidence ratings (6 
point scale) beside each noun to indicate their "feelings 
that they could recognize the correct figure on a multiple-
choice recognition test." It was stressed that these 
ratings should reflect the degree to which they felt they 
knew the answer. (For full instructions, see Appendix B). 
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After the recall task was completed ^s were given the 
recognition test. After turning their answer sheets over to 
the recognition test, the Ss made a check mark beside one of 
the two figures paired with each noun. Completion of the 
recognition test terminated the experimental session. 
Results 
Analysis of recall and recognition scores 
For the group given one presentation of the 16 pairs 
the average recall and recognition scores were 4.45 and 12.91, 
whereas for the £s given two presentations the corresponding 
statistics were 7.75 and 14.58. Memory scores were signifi­
cantly higher for the two-list group for both recall (t=3.00) 
and recognition (t=2.06); £<.01 for each. 
Signal detection analyses 
The discrimination of recognition correctness was in­
vestigated both as a function of feeling of knowing judge­
ments and as a function of partial recall scores. However, 
since the ability to discriminate the correctness and in­
correctness of recognition is indeterminate when recognition 
is perfect, S^s who did not make recognition errors were 
omitted from analysis. There was one such S in the single 
presentation condition and four in the group who received two 
presentations. One additional S in the latter group was not 
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used because of omissions on both recall and recognition items. 
This occurred in spite of the general instructions to guess 
on every item not recalled or recognized. The discriminability 
in feeling of knowing judgements is also only of interest 
in the absence of full recall. Therefore, items for which 
all four attributes were recalled were also omitted from 
analysis. 
In general there were few recognition failures and it was 
not possible to obtain stable operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves for the present data. Instead, a single d' (dis­
criminability) index was calculated for both part scores and 
confidence judgements within each of the two groups of Ss. 
Part scores were the number of attributes (less than four) 
recalled for each item and for the detection analysis were 
treated the same as the confidence ratings of items. 
Within a group part scores and confidence ratings were 
partitioned into "yes" and "no" responses at a point deter­
mined for each S_ as his point of neutral bias. This was done 
so the event matrices could be collapsed over Ss without 
fear that bias differences would lower the discriminability 
index. 
All tests of d' values were computed using the formulae 
of Gourevitch and Galanter (1967). For the group who received 
one list presentation the part score and confidence judgement 
d''s were .29 and .37; these values did not differ significant­
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ly (G=.30). For the group who received two lists the corre­
sponding values were .99 and .75, and these also were not 
different (G=.66). 
Each d' was, however, significantly greater than zero 
(£ < .05 for each single list d'; and £ < .01 for each under 
the two list condition). Additionally, the part score d' 
was significantly higher for the two presentation group 
(G=2.23, £ < .05) , but confidence rating d''s did not differ 
as a function of number of lists presented (G=1.22). 
To summarize these results, both part scores and confi­
dence ratings indicate accuracy in the prediction of future 
recognitions. However, the feeling of knowing judgements 
did not surpass part scores in this regard. Further, there 
was evidence that the discrimination of recognition correct­
ness was better for the condition of greater learning. 
Discussion 
It appears that the concept of partial recall as an 
explanation of the feeling of knowing phenomenon has received 
support. However, there are some limitations on this con­
clusion. First, the high recognition scores detracted from 
the stable estimation of recognition predictability; the two-
choice recognition items were undoubtedly responsible for this. 
It is possible that more false recognitions (the analogous 
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counterpart of noise trials in the signal detection experi­
ment) would have produced a more powerful test of d' dif­
ferences , and perhaps this manipulation would have shown 
greater predictability for the feeling of knowing judgements. 
The reversal of this trend found in the two-list group, how­
ever, tends to minimize the lack of power argument. 
Next, the relationship between d' and recognition per­
formance is in essential agreement with a recent report by 
the present author in which factors determining the discrimi­
nation of correctness in multiple-choice tasks were analyzed 
(Hochhaus, 1970). Guessing was found to be an important 
factor and it was argued that d' should be expected to 
correlate with probability correct. Evidence for this was 
also found in the present study; the d''s were higher in the 
group receiving two list presentations. 
Although the present data indicate that the discrimina­
tion of future recognition correctness could be based on the 
recall of parts of an answer, it is not strictly necessary 
that this be the case. Feelings of knowing could be based on 
sources of information as yet unspecified, whereas the partial 
recalls might relate to recognition performance in an inde­
pendent fashion. At this point it should be worthwhile to 
point out alternative explanations of the "feeling of knowing" 
phenomenon. 
First, response competition might produce situations 
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where the S considers more than one response alternative as an 
answer. In cases where an incorrect associate is given as an 
intrusion the S may still feel the correct response is ultimate­
ly available. The test of this possibility would require the 
provision for or the encouragement of multiple responses. Fol­
lowing this, an analysis of feeling of knowing judgements for 
items to which the correct answer was never given might show 
little or lessened recognition correctness discrimination. 
Another possibility is that Ss can remember having learned 
something without actually knowing what it is they have learned. 
For example, in scanning reference books for forgotten in­
formation, people often report whether the material sought 
was on a right or left hand page; it seems likely that even 
the quadrant of the page could be remembered. Thus, it could 
be that "knowing that you know" is based on a direct process 
of "knowing that you once knew." Experimental evidence is 
lacking here, however, and it would appear that investi­
gation of the phenomenon of memory for learning locations 
might be fruitful in leading to understanding the feeling of 
knowing experiences. 
Still another means of predicting recognition could be 
based on the S_* s assessment of the difficulty of the question 
being asked. In the original experiments (Hart, 1965, 1966) 
general information questions were used. Cues within the 
question such as the familiarity of terms used might provide 
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a basis for discriminating recognition capacity. This argu­
ment breaks down, however, for the paired-associate tasks, 
although Ss could conceivably discriminate the recency of 
having seen the stimulus on the previous learning trial and 
use this information to judge recognizability. As such, the 
process would require knowledge and application of learning 
curve principles, and does not appear to be a strong explana­
tory concept for Hart's later studies and the present in­
vestigation. 
As a final alternative, the two-process model of memory 
perhaps deserves the most consideration. Although similari­
ties and differences between recognition and recall have been 
investigated for many years now (e.g., MacDougall, 1904; 
Luh, 1922) it is surprising how little has been learned. 
Arguments for a single-process account of recognition and 
recall (e.g.. Postman, Jenkins and Postman, 1948) seem as 
frequent as two-process views (e.g., Kintsch, 1970). Like 
Adams (1967), Kintsch argues for a two-process explanation 
and perhaps offers the most convincing argument to date, al­
though he does not relate his model to the "feeling of knowing" 
phenomenon. The following is a review of what Kintsch feels 
are "important qualitative differences" between recognition 
and recall. 
First, the meaningfulness relationship is reversed for 
recognition. Low-frequency Thorndike-Lorge words are better 
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recognized than high-frequency words (e.g., Shepard, 1967). 
Also, in unpublished research the present author has found 
this reversal with words scaled for meaningfulness (words 
were rated for "ideational frequency and intensity" by inde­
pendent Ss). In contrast, however, it should be noted that 
Martin (1967) found no such reversal of the meaningfulness 
relationship with CVC syllables; high meaningfulness syllables 
were recognized better than low meaningfulness ones. 
Next, the intention or determination to learn has been 
found to aid recall but not recognition (Achilles, 1920; 
Hollingworth, 1913). Kintsch used similar findings (Postman, 
Adams and Phillips, 19 55; Estes and DaPolito, 1967) to argue 
that recall involves an additional search process while recog­
nition does not. 
The next basis for Kintsch's two-process conclusion is 
the lack of interference effects in recognition. Although 
recognition studies have shown both proactive inhibition 
(Peixotto, 1947) and retroactive inhibition (McKinney, 19 35; 
Postman, 1952), the magnitude of these effects has been less 
than that in recall. In some cases interference effects have 
been almost entirely absent (Bower and Bostrum, 1968; Postman 
and Stark, 1969). 
Last, the organization (i.e., inter-relatedness) of items 
to be learned does not appear to be a factor in recognition 
(Kintsch, 1968). The strong facilitative effects of 
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organization on free recall are, however, well known (e.g., 
Cofer, Bruce, and Reicher, 1966) , and Kintsch used this to 
add to his argument that search processes are not a factor 
in recognition memory. 
Because the factors of meaningfulness, intent to learn, 
interference, and organization all seem to show highly dif­
ferent effects on performance depending on the method of 
measurement, Kintsch has concluded that "the basic difference 
between recall and recognition appears to be that recall 
involves a search process and recognition does not," (p. 337). 
However, this account and the two-trace system proposed by 
Adams (1967) do not seem operationally distinct. 
In terms of the multicomponent view, it is as if items 
in memory consist of a set or cluster of attributes contain­
ing two basically distinct types of attributes or "tags," 
those used in retrieval and those used in recognition. For 
the purpose of exposition let's call these attributes "S-
features," or "R-features," depending on whether they are used 
in search or récognitive processes. S-features would be used 
in locating an item in memory, presumably by some sort of "con­
tent addressable" system. R-features, on the other hand, could 
not serve this purpose and could only be used as a basis for 
identifying the appropriateness or correctness of the item. 
This identification might be based on novel or ideosyncratic 
association leading from the item to other memory locations. 
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While such a conceptualization is not alien to the multi-
component view, it is contrary to the spirit of the partial 
recall account proposed here as the basis of the "feeling of 
knowing" phenomenon. In effect, the present data do not 
require the postulation of separate R-feature processes; it 
is felt that small groups of S-features (partial recalls) 
are sufficient for the prediction of recognition by indivi­
duals . 
In spite of this adequacy, however, several important 
questions are left unanswered concerning the role of recall 
in the recognition process. Yet, on the other hand, certain 
paths of inquiry are indicated. First, to what extent is 
recognition based on information not available through recall? 
Is the information retrieved through search sufficient to 
explain recognition performance? What should false recalls 
say about the capacity to recognize; for example, if in the 
memory of nonsense syllables the correct response is CHJ 
and the £ recalls "CHX" does this mean he is guessing about 
the last letter or does it mean that his stored information 
has dictated his response? What if he had instead been asked 
to make a recognition choice between CHJ and CHX; which would 
he have chosen? 
Unfortunately, certain properties of logical analysis 
may preclude the answer to this last question. We would like 
to know what recognition choice would be made if the S were 
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tested with the right answer in addition to the answer most 
representative of his recall storage, yet we cannot know the 
latter unless we have actually tested recall. 
If recall is tested and later the _S is given a con­
tingent recognition test, part of the problem is that it is 
possible that because we have introduced this activity the 
intrusion could be learned and upon subsequent recognition 
testing the S may be in a memory state different from that 
just prior to recall. Furthermore, if the recognition test 
is based on the ^'s recall performance, experimental control 
is lost; cause-effect relationships cannot be inferred. 
Recognition distractors based on errors common to a large 
population of Ss might help answer the question experimentally, 
and such a study has been done. Dale and Baddeley (1962) 
found that the use of common recall errors as recognition 
decoys reduced recognition; yet performance was still accu­
rate. The difficulty here is the lack of control over ideo-
syncratic errors, and we return to the problem of sampling 
or correlational analysis. 
A meaningful alternative would be to observe recall per­
formance and infer what recognition performance would have 
been on the basis of partial recalls. An assumption is made 
that the recalls best represent what has been stored in memory, 
and the question then is whether or not this information is 
sufficient to account for recognition performance without the 
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necessity of postulating additional information accessible 
only in recognition testing. It is possible that the 
data of the present experiment might shed light on this 
question. 
Because of the contrast of approach between the present 
view and the dual process notion of recall and recognition 
memory, an additional analysis was carried out on the data 
of Study I. It is as if a simulation of recognition were 
carried out on the basis of recall performance. Instead of 
using separate Ss for recall and recognition, or the same Ss 
tested at different times with similar materials, identical 
materials were used with recognition following recall. This 
method takes advantage of intra-individual covariation in 
performance, and, fortunately, makes error learning in the 
recall interval of diminished importance to the conclusion 
of equality between recognition and recall. Recall testing 
prior to recognition does reduce recognition (Postman, Jenkins 
and Postman, 1948), but such an effect would serve to make 
the simulation easier. Thus, a simulation failure could be 
considered as evidence for the existence of process dif­
ferences between recall and recognition, with the latter 
having access to information beyond that of recall. 
The following is a report of a simulation of recognition 
based on partial recall scores. As indicated, the data of 
Study I were used as the basis of the simulation. 
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For each S-R pair for each S, the parts of a response 
were analyzed to predict each later recognition choice that 
would be made for that pair. The (simulated) recognition 
choice was always that term which overlapped on the greatest 
number of dimensions with the recall response. When ties 
occurred a guess was recorded and it was assumed that in the 
two-choice situation that prevailed half of these guesses 
would be correct. Next, the 16 simulated recognition 
responses for each £ were combined to provide a simulated 
error total ; these are shown in Figure 1, as are the actual 
recognition error scores achieved. 
It can be seen that simulated error scores are higher 
than actual error scores, and a Sign test (Walker and Lev, 
1953) showed the difference as significant (£=.01). It 
appears that at the time of recall, £s did not provide all 
of the information about the stimuli which was ultimately 
available to them at the time of recognition testing. Several 
factors, however, must be considered before the data are 
taken as evidence for the dual process theory. 
First, the memory items were presented as visual 
figures in the recognition test and symbolically in recall 
testing (see Appendix A). It is possible that other com­
binations of testing modes would have changed the result. 
Second, because of differences in difficulty between recall 
and recognition in terms of the information and number of 
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1  p r e s e n t a t i o n  2  p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
s i m u l a t e d  a c t u a l  s i m u l a t e d  a c t u a l  
3 . 5  3  3  3  
5  4  2 . 5  3  
6 .  5  6  2  1  
5  3  4 . 5  6  
1 1  1 . 5  2  
2.5 1 2.5 1 
1 0  3  1  
5 . 5  8  . 5  0  
5  3  1 0  
4  0  1 0  
3 3 1.5 0 
4 6 0 0 
9  5  
X 4.23 3.31 1.92 1.41 
Figure 1. Recognition error scores; simulated and actual 
performance 
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alternatives with which Ss dealt, motivational factors could 
have made recall responses less informationally rich; in 
future studies of this design it would be advisable to pay 
Ss on the basis of recall and recognition performance to 
insure a concerted approach to both tasks. Last, it was 
assumed that in cases of conflicting partial recalls a guess 
would be made and that half of these guesses would be correct. 
On the other hand, it is possible that £s didn't treat each 
recalled dimension as equally valid in making their recog­
nition choices. If Ss could weigh these validities approp­
riately, it is even possible that all cases of ties would 
have led to correct recognition. 
In spite of these criticisms, the outcome of the simu­
lation is in line with the dual process interpretation; it 
remains to be seen whether controlled experiments specifically 
designed to test this issue will replicate the present 
effect. Thus, while the data are somewhat equivocal, the 
present approach has provided a research design which shows 
some promise for distinguishing the two theoretical viewpoints. 
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STUDY II 
Study II was an attempt to learn about the correctness 
discrimination of second guesses in the multiple-choice 
recognition paradigm. Additionally, several predictions drawn 
from the multicomponent theory of memory were tested. At 
present, theoretical accounts have only emphasized an elimi­
nation process as the explanation of second guessing behavior 
(e.g./ Brown, 1965a, Murdock, 1963). It was hoped that the 
multicomponent model would probe more deeply into the dy­
namics of the elimination process itself. 
As indicated earlier, when response terms are specifiable 
in terms of the organization and inter-relatedness of component 
attributes, it may be possible to discover factors both in 
correctness discriminability and second guessing behaviors. 
In general, where response terms are more structured, more 
information will be found both in first choice errors and in 
second choices. Additionally, it was predicted that factors 
which lead to response structure also lead to increased 
correctness discrimination. 
Subjects 
The 28 £s were students from the source described earlier. 
Assignment of the £s to the response similarity conditions, 
dimensional stimuli (DS) and nondimensional stimuli (NDS), 
was counterbalanced on the basis of order of appearnce. 
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Instrumentation 
Figure 2 shows the face plate of one of six electro­
luminescent panels used. The panels measured 3" x 4" and were 
displayed in a vertical column with a 2" separation between 
panels. A wide versatility of displays was possible with 
the equipment; individual elements of each panel could be 
operated independently and combinations of elements could 
also be used. The programming of patterns as well as dura­
tion intervals was achieved through the use of a Wang Block 
Tape Reader; paper tapes used to control the reader were 
punched by a Friden Flexowriter. 
Task 
The general design was a modification of the "probe" 
paired-associate technique (e.g., Murdock, 1966) where the 
stimulus terms were represented by the six panels. The 
probe in this case was the dot (r) in the lower right hand 
corner of each panel. A probe lasted 18 sec. and was the 
S_'s cue to recall the pattern (single element) which had been 
displayed on that trial. A trial consisted of lighting one 
of four elements (b, f, j, or n for the DS condition and c, 
e, k, or m for NDS) on one panel for 2 sec., and doing the 
same for each other panel in a random sequence. In a sense, 
each panel could be in one of four possible "states" and 
these states were shown to the S one at a time. It was the 
figure ù • 
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S*s task to remember these states as accurately as possible. 
Following presentation, one panel was probed. The dot 
appeared for 25 sec. on the panel whose state was to be re­
ported. 
Lists 
For the present task it is possible to define serial 
position in two ways, namely, in terms of the temporal order 
of inputs or in terms of the spatial arrangement of stimuli. 
To balance the inputs a modification of the latin square 
design was used. A 4 x 4 latin square with two rows and two 
columns added was used in two replications. This allowed a 
desirable balance wherein each of the four response terms 
was represented as the tested item three times in each 
temporal order and three times in each spatial position. 
Having thus fixed the temporal and spatial position of 
each probe as well as which response would be correct for 
each of these, the remaining five inputs of each trial were 
determined. The five unused temporal and spatial positions 
were randomly permuted to exhaust each category. Also, 
response alternatives were assigned with the following 
restrictions : No response term could represent more than two 
input states within a single trial, and each response term 
appeared an equal number of times in each temporal position. 
In addition to the 72 experimental trial lists described 
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above, 21 other trials were drawn up. Of these, 15 were 
practice trials used to acquaint the Ss to the task. There 
were also three warm up trials which preceded each experi­
mental block of 36 trials. These additional trial lists 
were representative of the actual experimental trials used. 
Paper punch tape was prepared coding the above informa­
tion onto four separate blocks of paper. Tape 1 contained 
three trials which were presented with no testing during the 
reading of instructions. Tape 2 contained the 18 practice 
trials/ whereas tapes 3 and 4 contained three warm up and 
36 experimental trials each. 
Procedure 
The Ss were tested individually in sessions lasting 
approximately an hour. A 10 minute rest interval was provided 
between the two major trial blocks. 
The two experimental conditions of stimulus similarity, 
DS and NDS, were determined by the four elements chosen as 
response terms. Elements b, f, j, and n correspond to the 
DS condition, whereas elements c, e, k, and m represent the 
NDS condition (see Figure 2). The shift in similarity con­
dition was made by rewiring the equipment rather than by 
making additional paper tapes. 
To begin, the S was shown a card depicting the four 
elements appropriate to his experimental condition; these were 
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labeled a, b, c, and d, respective of the above orders. 
Also, the dot was shown on the card and was labeled as a 
"query or test of memory." Next, Ss were told to merely 
watch the three practice presentations "to get an idea of 
what it is you'll be asked to remember." At this point a 
trial was defined for the S; also, he was informed of the 
nature of the probe test of memory. The S was then instructed 
in the second guess and confidence procedure, and when this 
was understood the practice trials began. Following the 
first recall attempts the S was given feedback concerning 
the accuracy of his responses. If the first response was 
correct he was asked to merely wait for the next trial. How­
ever, if the first response was an error he was asked to make 
a second choice from among the remaining three alternatives. 
Also the S was asked to rate each second choice as to how 
certain he was that he was correct. Confidence ratings were 
indicated by a verbal declaration of "right" or "wrong" by 
the £. No feedback was given concerning second choices. 
The E recorded all responses on an answer sheet (IBM 
document 505). Rather than blackening spaces on the sheet, 
E instead wrote a 1 for the first answer and a 2 for the 
second. Beside each second answer the E recorded R (right) 
or W (wrong) corresponding to S's two-point confidence rating 
for that response. 
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Results and Discussion 
Memory curves 
Figure 3 shows memory performance both as a function 
of the temporal order of inputs and in terms of the spatial 
arrangement of stimuli. The temporal serial position curve 
is characterized by a marked recency effect and only a 
slight primacy effect, whereas the analysis of spatial posi­
tions showed slight superiority for the top and bottom 
positions. Overall probability correct was .60. 
Tests of the multicomponent model 
To begin, only trials on which an error occurred were 
analyzed. Additionally, this is the case for each of the 
statistical tests to follow. 
First, it was hypothesized that errors depend on correct 
responses, and that this dependency should be greater for 
the DS than for the NDS condition. To test this, errors were 
recorded in a "confusion matrix" (separately for each condi­
tion). These matrices are shown in Figure 4. Here, Ss' 
responses were entered as a function of the correct response. 
Under null conditions there is no relationship between correct 
responses and the errors which are given. That is, the entries 
of each matrix are entirely reproducible from the marginal 
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Figure 3. Probability correct for serial and spatial 
positions 
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(6 df.) where a significant value of this statistic indi­
cates a rejection of the above stated null condition. The 
Chi-square values for the DS and NDS conditions were 28.24 
(£ < .01) and 15.56 (£ < .05). There is evidence for the 
predicted interaction with similarity conditions (£ < .01, 
cf. Knepp and Entwisle, 1969). 
A second method of investigating possible memory 
representations in terms of dimensions is to note the common 
dimension, horizontal (H), vertical (V), or diagonal (D), 
between correct responses and errors. The proportion of 
each of these types of errors was as follows: DS condition; 
H=26%, V=44%, D=30%; NDS condition; H=26%, V=47%, D=27%. 
Thus in both similarity conditions there was a strong 
tendency to make errors which bore a common horizontal 
attribute (right or left) with the correct response. In 
other words, errors tended to be above or below the target 
item. 
Next, second guesses were predicted to be above chance 
accuracy and again that the effect interacts with similarity 
conditions. Chance performance on second choices in the 
present task is one-third correct. The proportions of second 
guesses correct for the DS and NDS conditions were .54 
(Z=6.68, £ < .01) and .45 (Z=3.99, £ < .01). As expected, 
the difference in these proportions was also significant 






a b e d  a b e d  
a - 14 33 23 a - 26 32 23 
b 14 - 18 27 b 15 - 13 26 
34 9 - 12 c 28 19 14 
d 21 29 30 - d 22 26 13 
Figure 4. Confusion matrices showing the relationship 
between errors and correct responses 
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In the next analysis the dependency of second choices 
on first choices was of interest. According to the multi-
component view, the reason second choices relate to first 
choices is because of common encoding attributes. In the 
present experiment Ss may have emphasized the encoding of 
items on the basis of the horizontal dimension, devoting 
less time to the processing of other aspects of the stimuli. 
Thus, first and second responses would tend to share at­
tributes (right or left) on this dimension. It follows that 
the most likely first-second choice combination would be to 
pick elements on the same side of the display panel. This 
effect was predicted to be less under the NDS similarity con­
dition where the right-left dimension is less vividly por­
trayed. 
To test this hypothesis a second set of matrices was 
developed and these are shown in Figure 5. Under null con­
ditions no contingency should be found between first and second 
responses. Again the Chi-square test was used and as before 
both DS and NDS conditions showed a significant contingency 
relationship; Chi-square =27.44 and 26.81, respectively. The 
patterns are highly similar to those found between correct 
responses and first choice errors. In this case, however, 
there was no evidence for the predicted interaction. 
Last, it was hypothesized that confidence ratings depend 
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Figure 5. Matrices showing the relationship between first 
and second responses 
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attribute discussed in the preceding analyses, when a first 
choice error contains this memory attribute in common with 
the correct response, the certainty rating of the second 
response should be greater. To test this hypothesis, errors 
were classified on the basis of the common dimension (H, V, 
or D) between the error and the correct response. The con­
fidence ratings of second guesses associated with these 
classifications were subjected to an analysis of variance. 
The effects of the similarity treatment were also included 
in the analysis, as was the interaction of these treatments 
with the classifications. The result is shown in Figure 6; 
none of the factors were significant. A specific linear 
comparison of horizontal versus nonhorizontal memory showed 
the contrast to be of marginal importance in confidence 
ratings (F=3.19, not significant). It does not appear that 
the retention of the major memory dimension leads to signifi­
cantly higher confidence in second guessing ability. 
Signal detection analysis 
It is already established that Ss can discriminate the 
correctness of second guess responses (Brown,1965a). Here 
the question is whether this ability is systematically 
affected by the dimensionality of the stimulus array. 
An attempt was made to estimate discrimination parameters 
for individual Ss. The attempt was somewhat successful, but 
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Source Mean Square F 
Treatments (T) 1 144.98 <1.00 
Subjects (S)/T 16 666.76 
Classifications (C) 2 258.20 1.64 
T X C 2 11.99 <1.00 
S/T X C 32 157.30 
Figure 6. Analysis of variance 
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one difficulty was encountered. Certain ^s achieved hit or 
false alarm rates of 1.00 or 0.00, and in such cases d' 
is not defined. The elimination of these £s left eight 
d' values in the DS condition and six in the NDS condition. 
The d' averages for these groups were, respectively, .32 and 
.41. Thus, while each of these values is significantly 
greater than zero (t-tests), there is, of course, no evidence 
that Ss in the DS group were better in correctness discrim­
ination than those in the NDS condition. 
By way of summary, the main effect of stimulus dimension­
ality in the present investigation has not been a powerful 
one; in only two of the five analyses did this factor sig­
nificantly change the test outcome. A clue to this result 
is given in terms of the pattern of errors observed; nearly 
half of these represented a generically correct response to 
the appropriate side of the display, under both conditions 
of stimulus dimensionality. Furthermore, it seems highly 
likely that the vertical column of display panels was 
responsible. Whether the ultimate explanation shall be given 
in terms of relevant eye movements, interference effects for 
the coding of vertical and diagonal values, or some other 
factor, unfortunately, cannot be specified for the present 
experiment. However, a few cautious conclusions can be 
drawn. First, Ss appear to have been sufficiently challenged 
by the task. Probability correct was .60, where .25 
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represents chance performance. Next, the differential 
forgetting of the potential encoding dimensions points to a 
systematic attempt on the part of the Ss to reduce their 
cognitive strain in the task. If the dimensional repre­
sentation of items in memory did occur, the effect was the 
same for both experimental treatments; objectively, the 
important feature of the stimulus was its right or left 
position on the instrument panel. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Several things have been learned from the present investi­
gation. In Study I, a first attempt was made in explaining 
the "feeling of knowing" phenomenon in terms of part-whole 
processes. Tulving (1970) has implied that memory's 
"knowledge of its own contents" reflects some special talent 
held only by humans; the present data, however, do not demand 
this interpretation. "Feeling of knowing" judgements con­
tained no information about future recognition performance 
which was not already contained in partial recalls. Thus, 
as an alternative to the dual process view, it is felt that 
Ss based their judgements directly on the parts of a response 
which were remembered. 
However, while both interpretations are adequate to the 
facts of feeling of knowing experiments, the present study 
does not distinguish the validity of either position. It 
is a weak argument to counter the dual process conception 
as lacking in parsimony; research is needed to resolve the 
issue. The simulation of recognition on the basis of partial 
recalls was an attempt to provide this. In this case, the 
information in partial recalls was not sufficient to predict 
all of recognition. Dual process theories would perhaps 
interpret this as support; however, the present account has 
suggested that the residual information resides in the S's 
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knowledge of validity differences in the parts remembered. 
Despite the ambiguity, it was suggested that the simulation 
technique might prove useful in resolving the issue. 
In the last study it was hoped that additional tests of 
the multicomponent model could be made. However, the mani­
pulation of structure among the elements of the six display 
panels was completely outweighed by dimensional preferences 
which seemed to arise out of the gross structure of the task. 
When the latter preferences were analyzed in terms of the 
multicomponent view of memory, some support was found for the 
notion that the confidence ratings of second guesses in the 
multiple-choice task depended on partial recall. When the 
dominant "part" (right versus left) was remembered on the 
first choice, the confidence ratings of second guesses were 
higher than when the primary part was not remembered. As in 
Study I, it appears that "knowing that you know" may not be 
an additional process beyond merely "knowing part." If any­
thing, the process of correctness discrimination is a logical 
one rather than memorial; individuals remember a part, and 
when asked about certainty, their judgements are based on 
the number of parts recalled. 
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APPENDIX B 
The following instructions were read to each 
"This is a learning experiment in which you will learn 
to associate words and geometric figures. It is very im­
portant that you follow the instructions carefully. Should 
you fail to follow any instruction, be sure to tell me since 
this would be important to the interpretation of the 
results." 
"The list will consist of 16 pairs of items like the 
pair on this card. (The E shows an example card.) These 
pairs will be shown to you one at a time above this parti­
tion; you will see each pair for about 2 sec. You are to 
study each pair such that later when you are shown the 
words alone you can recall the figure that was paired with 
each word earlier." 
"Now, let me show you some more example figures.... 
The figures we will be dealing with were constructed by a 
few simple rules: There are only two possible colors, white 
or black; only two possible sizes, small or large; and only 
two possible shapes, square or triangle. Last, the number 
of figures paired with the stimulus word may vary. In some 
cases a single figure will be paired with the word, while 
sometimes the figure will be presented doubly, that is, mere­
ly repeated on the same card." (During the discussion of 
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figures E shows example response terms for each dimension 
as these are described.) 
"After you have studied the full list of 16 word-
figure pairs you will be given a sheet of paper containing 
the 16 words. As you look at each word try to recall the 
figure that was paired with it earlier. Next, you are to 
make your answer by marking a set of symbols which you'll 
find to the side of each word. These symbols are arranged 
in 4 pairs corresponding to the dimensions I have just 
described. Your first choice will depend on whether the 
figure was single or double, and here you are to circle 
either a 1 or a 2. Next is size, and you circle either large 
or small; next color, black or white; and finally, shape, 
either square or triangle. For example, if your answer was 
2 large black squares you would circle the 2, then large, 
then black, and then square. Do you understand? If you are 
unsure about any of these dimensions do not leave any 
answer out. Go ahead and guess since this will not be 
counted against you and it is important to have a complete 
record of your learning." 
After the study trials the instructions were extended 
as follows: 
"Here is the list of words; work from the top of the 
page down and do not omit any answers. However, before you 
begin I have a further instruction. In the left hand margin 
I 
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you are to put down a number from 1 to 6 to tell me how sure 
or confident you are that you could recognize the correct 
answer on a multiple-choice recognition test. Use the number 
6 if you are very certain that you know the answer and use 
the number 1 if you are not at all sure. Additionally, you 
may use any whole number in between to indicate greater or 
less confidence. Remember, these numbers should reflect your 
feeling that you could recognize the correct answer... 
regardless of whether you recalled the answer or not. When 
you have finished do not turn you paper over; just put your 
pencil down and look up. Do you understand? Go ahead." 
Upon completion of the recall task the recognition test 
was administered with the following instructions; 
"Now I want you to take a multiple-choice recognition 
test. When I say 'ready' I want you to turn your paper over 
and again work through the list of words from the top to the 
bottom of the sheet. Beside each word you'll find two 
response terms separated by a thickened line. Make a small 
check mark by the figure which you feel is correct. Do you 
understand? Ready? Go." 
